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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to analyze pro-democracy movements in post-Soviet countries through
the lens of existing theories of democratization to determine why a particular protest movement
succeeded or failed. Through a qualitative analysis of theories of democratization and four case
studies – Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Belarus – this thesis finds that the theories of
democratization are ultimately applicable and helpful in understanding these case studies, albeit
in different ways. Whereas the theories and their predictions might be proven correct in the cases
of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the opposite is true in Russia and Belarus, where authoritarian
regimes have taken steps to counteract democratic pressure in their countries.
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Introduction
Democratization in the post-Soviet space became an important issue in the years
following the collapse of the USSR as a new era of political development began across the
former USSR. The challenge of negotiating a transition away from the remnants of the Soviet
command economy, forging new political institutions, and establishing ties with the rest of the
world was handled differently by each of the former Soviet republics. Some, like the Baltic
states, quickly transitioned to democracy and a market economy. Others had a much different
experience of democratization, filled with political and social unrest. Outside of the Baltics, the
dramatic pro-democracy protest movements only began over a decade after the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991. State-supported democratization and privatization efforts were the
preferred way forward during the 1990s, but by the 2000s, the average citizen still had not seen
many of the democratic or economic improvements that had been promised at independence,
setting the stage for frustrated and angry citizens joining together in mass protests to accelerate
democratic reform in their countries.
The first of a long series of political upheavals and mass protests among the nations of
the post-Soviet sphere took place in Georgia in 2003. The protest movements, beginning in
Georgia but spreading to other post-Soviet republics, shook the foundations of the post-Soviet
order in their demands for more democratic governance. Democratization can be understood here
with the broad definition set out by Grugel and Bishop: the “introduction and extension of
citizenship rights and the creation of a democratic state,” or what Grugel and Bishop term
“substantive” democratization, in which citizens’ rights do not only exist on paper but also have
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“real meaning” for people.1 In the years since Georgia’s transition to democracy, a number of
other, similar protest movements across the post-Soviet sphere, but not all were successful in the
same way that Georgia’s protest movement was. This thesis seeks to answer the question of why
some pro-democracy protest movements succeed in ousting non-democratic governments while
others fail. What factors are important in determining the success or failure of a protest
movement? Existing theories about the process of democratization may explain some of the
factors that determine whether a protest movement succeeds or fails. The hypothesis for this
thesis is that pro-democracy protests are more likely to be successful in countries with more links
to other democratic countries and whose post-socialist economic reforms led to less state control
of key industries and less dependence on the Russian petro-economy.
There are several theories of democratization that may aid in understanding why protests
succeeded or failed in certain countries. Some of these theories have been used to describe the
so-called "color revolutions," such as the theories surrounding the diffusions of ideas, protests,
and tactics across borders; the strength of the state security apparatus; the agency of the
democratic activists mobilizing support for the protest movements; and the structure of the
country's post-Soviet economic and political reforms. These theories can be grouped together
based on whether they describe endogenous or exogenous factors in order to more easily make
comparisons between countries and democratization movements. Diffusion and international
linkages are exogenous, while the agency, security apparatus, and reform theories are each
endogenous. This thesis will apply these theories to four selected case studies—Georgia in 2003,
Russia in 2011, and Belarus and Kyrgyzstan in 2020—in order to determine which factors may
have played a role in the success or failure of the pro-democracy protest movements in those
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countries. While many things changed globally in the seventeen years between the first and most
recent protest movements, these cases are comparable to one another because they each started
off in roughly similar positions in the early 1990s – newly independent, and with immense
political and economic instability. The effects of new developments in technology, especially
with regard to the Internet and social media, and the political cultures of the countries in reaction
to international events also serve as valuable areas of comparison.
Literature Review
There is a great deal of scholarly literature on the topic of democratization, particularly in
regard to post-Soviet transitions to democracy and their successes and failures, and much of it is
relevant to the protests and social movements to be examined in this thesis. The literature on
democratization contains several theories that may be used to analyze the protest movements in
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Georgia. Such theories deal with topics like economic
development, participation of political and economic elites in democratization, and the design of
formal state institutions and informal practices. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik in their book
Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries summarize several of the generally
accepted theories and processes of democratization, such theories about diffusion, international
linkages, economic development and reform, and then analyze several postcommunist countries
that have seen some form of pro-democracy movement. 2 Their analyses of Belarus, Georgia, and
Kyrgyzstan focus on the spreading of protest tactics across national borders from other protest
sites, the role of linkages and democracy promotion from the West, the control of the state
security apparatus, and the role of local political elites in determining potential causes for why
protests succeeded or failed.
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Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way in their article “International Linkage and
Democratization” present one of the important theories of democratization in the form of the
international “linkages” between countries that help influence democratization’s spread. In short,
the linkage theory contends that the more international linkages (connections) a country has to
other democratic countries, the more likely it is that the country will experience some level of
democratization. Levitsky and Way write that linkage “raises the cost of autocratic
behavior…[increases] the odds of an international response, and [creates] influential
constituencies for political change.”3 Further, Kristian Gleditsch and Michael Ward promote the
related theory of diffusion, which contends that democratization processes and tactics spread
across borders, and find that more connections to other democracies can bolster support for
democratic reforms, a finding that lends itself to the international linkage theory. 4 This theory,
along with the theory of diffusion, can be used to describe exogenous factors that may help
determine the success or failure of protest movements.
Political and economic situations also influence democratization. Scott Radnitz suggests
in “The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and the Post-Soviet Revolutions”
that countries whose post-socialist economic reforms privatized large segments of the economy
relatively quickly created a new class of entrepreneurs and business people whose interests did
not always align with the interests of the state and who had enough money to help finance and
create effective opposition to some or all state policies. 5 In short, post-socialist countries who
privatized more of their economies are more likely to have higher levels of democratization and
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to have more sustainable democracies. Further, Mark R. Beissinger in his article “Structure and
Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip
Revolutions” proposes two models -- “elite defection” and “elite learning” -- that consider the
relationships between a country’s business and political elite and the political institutions they
are either defending or opposing.6 These models, in conjunction with other analysis, can be
helpful in understanding the development of the protest movements in relation to the support
shown by the political and business elites of a country.
Methodology
This thesis is a qualitative study of the factors that may influence the outcomes of prodemocracy protest movements. I have chosen to analyze four case studies of democratization
movements -- Georgia in 2003, Russia in 2011, and Belarus and Kyrgyzstan in 2020 -- because
they represent both successful and failed protest movements, and they show how the dynamics of
democratization may have changed over the seventeen-year time period. A successful protest
movement might be characterized by the ousting of the non-democratic or authoritarian
government and the installation of a more pro-democracy government in its place. A failed
protest movement might be characterized by the opposite situation, where the incumbent regime
stays in power, and the protests are broken up or fizzle out on their own when no progress is
made to remove the regime.
Georgia is perhaps the model for pro-democracy protests in the post-Soviet contexts, as it
was the first of the former Soviet republics to experience such a large democratization movement
that ended in success. The events in Russia in 2011 offer a glimpse into what regimes might do
to counteract democratic pressure and how differing organizational strategies among protesters
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might negatively affect the outcome for the protest movement. Kyrgyzstan and Belarus mirror
the other two case studies, but they also happened recently on a very politically different regional
stage, along with a radically different technological stage that impacted the tactics of
democratization movements. To answer the question of why the Russian and Belarusian protest
movements failed to create meaningful change while the Georgian and Kyrgyz movements
succeeded, these protest movements will be viewed through the lens of accepted theories of
democratization. These theories can be tested against more recent examples of pro-democracy
protests to show whether or not they are still relevant today. The four case studies selected for
analysis address success and failure in protest movements and are made up of a combination of
earlier and more recent movements. The 2003 Georgian protests and the 2011 Russian protests
have both been explored in the scholarly literature, and offer good examples of how theories
conform to practice and subsequent outcome, both in protest movement successes (Georgia) and
failures (Russia). The much more recent protest movements in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan in 2020
are very much entrenched in today’s social media landscape and the connectivity and access to
information it provides. This combination of case studies will allow for the testing of the
established theories, to see if they still hold up under these different conditions.
A variety of sources will be used to test each theory. The diffusion and the international
linkage theories will be examined through analysis of news reports, social media posts, and the
relevant scholarly literature. The agency of pro-democracy organizers likewise will be examined
through news reports and social media posts, with social media posts and other messaging likely
being the more useful sources. The analysis of the state security apparatus will depend upon
secondary sources, such as the existing literature and other publications by experts on the topic.
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Similarly, the post-communist political and economic reforms undertaken by each country will
be examined using the existing scholarly literature.
If a theory is correct or applicable, then relatively direct connections between the
conditions in the country and its transition to democracy will be found, such as evidence of
diffusion of protest tactics or the continued operations of foreign, pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations. The protest movements that will be examined occurred in 2003,
2011, and 2020, allowing the study to distinguish the potentially different outcomes based on
past and present, and the forms of communication and organization that changed between those
years. The older protest movements—those in Georgia and Russia—will be examined primarily
through secondary literature, given that Georgia has become one of the foremost cases of
successful postcommunist democratization upon which many of the theories have been
developed, and the Russian government’s anti-democratic efforts have influenced those in other
countries. The more recent protests will be examined primarily through sources such as
government statements, news reports, and social media, given how recently the protests
happened and how information was shared about them both domestically and internationally.
Structure of Thesis
This thesis is broken up into two main parts. The first presents the two successful protest
movements in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. This part will begin with a brief introduction for the
hypothesis and the relevant theories for what successful post-Soviet democratization efforts tend
to do well. The protests will have a chapter devoted to them to provide the necessary background
information and subsequent analysis. The second part of the thesis will present the two failed
protest movements from Russia and Belarus. As in the first part, there will be a brief introduction
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to the hypothesis and relevant theories as to why protests failed, followed by chapters devoted to
the background and analysis of the protest movements in each country.

9

Part I: Successful Protest Movements
By the early 2000s, democratization movements had taken hold in several countries
across Central Europe and the Balkans, providing examples for other pro-democracy movements
in the semi-authoritarian and authoritarian states of the former Soviet Union. A famous example
is that of Serbia, where elections and subsequent mass protests saw the ousting of Slobodan
Milosevic and the rise to power of the democratic opposition movement. 7 The events in Serbia in
2000 are not unlike what later happened in other democratizing countries across the former
Soviet Union. In the 1990s and early 2000s as old institutions were being dismantled, new
connections formed between the former Soviet republics and the democracies of the West,
political-economic structures changed, and pro-democracy activists coordinated and organized.
These factors, as understood through the lens of theories of democratization, may help explain
what is necessary for a pro-democracy movement to succeed.
The exogenous group of democratization theories -- diffusion and international linkages - is important to examine as countries across the former USSR transitioned from authoritarian
regimes to other forms of government. Western support for pro-democracy media outlets, nongovernmental organizations, and other groups is an important factor in determining the outcome
of pro-democracy protests, and the United States especially poured millions of dollars into
Eurasia after the collapse of the Soviet Union with the aim of promoting democracy, aiding prodemocracy elements of civil society all across the former USSR. 8 Aid such as this, and the
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linkages formed by it, contribute to the formation and success of a democratization movement by
supporting opposition news outlets in authoritarian regimes and providing financial resources to
pro-democracy NGOs and activists to which they would otherwise not have had access. This aid
strategy was used in Serbia beginning in 1998.9 Five years later, the US and other Western
democracies employed a similar strategy during Georgia’s transition to democracy.
The diffusion of pro-democracy ideas and activism tactics is not so dependent on outside,
state-level support, but it nonetheless crosses borders and influences democratization
movements. One example is that Serbia’s pro-democracy Otpor activists, successful in 2000,
eventually met with and trained the Kmara activists who would later be instrumental in the
protests that toppled Georgia’s government.10 For later democratization movements, the
Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” of 2004 would become the model to which pro-democracy
movements in other countries across the former Soviet Union looked for inspiration, even when
their chances for success were not very promising. 11 Of course, it also became the model which
repressive governments carefully analyzed and took steps to ensure it was never recreated in
their own countries.
The endogenous theories -- those that deal with the agency of pro-democracy activists,
the post-communist economic and political reforms, and the strength of the security apparatus -help explain the domestic conditions that allowed for the protests to succeed. The agency of
activists of course refers to their organization and how effective they are at mobilizing the
general public to take to the streets and protest. In successful protests, activists are often well
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organized and able to persuade people to join their cause and protest with them. The
postcommunist economic and political reforms of a country are an important structural condition
that can greatly influence democratization. Countries whose economic reforms have liberalized
the economy and facilitated the rise of a wealthy business elite are more likely to transition to
democracy. Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine is perhaps the most visible example of this theory in
practice; he turned from central banker to opposition politician to president of Ukraine following
sustained protests in 2004.
In some instances, the members of the business elite are simply oligarchs. However,
being an oligarch does not necessarily mean that a person is anti-democratic, and an oligarch’s
stance on democracy may not even really matter so long as they have the economic and political
means and willpower to seriously challenge an authoritarian regime. Generally business elites or
oligarchs might favor pluralism, which tends to characterize democracies (though it can apply to
other forms of government), to ensure that their interests are represented in the halls of power.
Coupled with immense economic influence and the accompanying political clout, business elites
can place pressure on authoritarian regimes where the general public or pro-democracy activists
may be unable.
The strength of the security apparatus is dependent on the political realities of the state it
is supposed to serve. In authoritarian countries with large, well-funded security organizations,
the state is much more likely to retain control against forces pushing for democratizations. The
struggle to maintain the state’s control over the country often depends on the cohesion and
effectiveness of the security apparatus in undermining or outright suppressing pro-democracy
movements and protests. The postcommunist economic and political reforms also play a role
here; the regimes in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which did not completely privatize their
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economies and instead relied on resource rents to pay for state activities, were able to use their
security apparatuses to repress even serious attempts at democratization. 12 Then there is the
culture of the apparatus to consider. If the various security agencies operating in a post-Soviet
republic were never reformed, or only slightly reformed, following independence it stands to
reason that their methods of coercion have likely not changed very much either. The
authoritarian bent of their pasts and their loyalty to the president or state before the people as a
whole may be part of why riot police and certain special operations units are relatively quick to
use force and brutality to clear the streets of pro-democracy protesters. In countries where
democratization occurs, the security apparatus is often unwilling or unable to effectively repress
the pro-democracy movements, potentially either because of reform or a lack of unswerving
loyalty to the state itself.
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Chapter 1: ‘Revolution’ in Georgia
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a turbulent decade for the newly
independent Georgia, just as it did in so many other post-Soviet countries. Georgia’s political
history of the 1990s is certainly bloodier than that of some of the other countries that emerged
from the ashes of the Soviet Union. In 1992, a violent coup d’état ousted the country’s first
democratically elected president, Zviad Gamaskhurdia, a Soviet dissident and pro-independence
activist.13 Soon after, Georgia spiraled into a bitter civil war that lasted until the mid-1990s,
along with the ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia that also plagued the country. Following
the coup, Eduard Shevardnadze, the former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia,
became Georgia’s second president. Under his leadership, Georgia earned something of a
reputation in the West for being a post-Soviet democratization success story, though this was an
unjustified reputation as old Soviet tendencies began to show themselves more and more in
Georgia’s governmental institutions.14 The pace of political and economic reforms slowed in the
mid-1990s as well, and the Shevardnadze’s ruling party fragmented and took heavy blows in the
2002 local elections.15 The long-running tradition of corruption in Georgia, developed over the
centuries of foreign rule, continued after the fall of the USSR. Shevardnadze, one of the
beneficiaries of the system of corruption in the Soviet era, perpetuated the system during his
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years in power, culminating in the fraudulent elections of 2003 that inspired thousands to take to
the streets.16
The 2003 elections were set to be an important midway point before the 2005 presidential
elections. During the campaigns, the various opposition parties partially coalesced and
participated in demonstrations against the Shevardnadze government together. 17 Mikheil
Saakashvili, leader of the New National Movement opposition party, became a major player in
the elections. In the days directly preceding the elections, however, chaos took hold as
Shevardnadze began working against holding free and fair elections and the international and
domestic monitors that were watching them. 18 The Central Electoral Commission had scrapped
the computer-generated voting lists, leading to hundreds of thousands of Georgian citizens being
turned away at the polls, and electoral commissions at other levels of government were
massively overreporting votes for Shevardnadze and his allies compared to the independent vote
tabulations of election observers.19
As allegations of massive electoral fraud emerged, tens of thousands of protesters began
spilling out into the streets of Tbilisi, led principally by Saakashvili -- this was the beginning of
Georgia’s “Rose Revolution.” On November 20, 2003, the Central Electoral Commission
announced the falsified results of the elections, sparking further domestic outrage and
international condemnation. Two days later, on November 22, Shevardnadze was convening the
new parliament, Saakashvili and a group of his supporters made their way into the parliament
chambers and disrupted the session. As Shevardnadze’s bodyguards hurried him away from the
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demonstrators, the members of parliament also dispersed. Shevardnadze fled to his residence,
declared a state of emergency, and vowed that the “revolutionaries” would be arrested. Despite
the heavy police presence at the parliament, the gathering of armed groups on both sides in the
wake of the emergency declaration, and Shevardnadze’s apparent willingness to use force, no
shots were ever fired. Shevardnadze, left with no real options, quickly resigned, paving the way
for a new, democratic government to form.
Endogenous Theories
Postcommunist Economic and Political Reforms
The 1990s were an incredibly turbulent time for Georgia. Ethnic conflicts between
Georgians, Ossetians, and Abkhazians predictably led to privatization reforms being deemed
much lower priority as compared to the security needs of the entire population. While not
spending time and resources defending territory from separatist operations in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, Georgia was also busy building itself a functioning state, something it had not
really needed to do before -- Georgia had been part of the Russian empire or Soviet Union for
roughly 200 years before its 1991 independence. 20 Throughout the 1990s, Georgia’s economy
was largely devastated.
Part of the reason for Georgia’s miserable economic situation throughout the 1990s was
its implementation of “shock therapy” reforms, parallel to those in Russia and other post-Soviet
countries.21 While these reforms obviously were disastrous in the short term for the Georgian
economy, they were likely a major driver in the formation of the 2003 democratization
movement. A small circle of elites were the chief beneficiaries of the reforms of the 1990s,
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controlling the most lucrative business enterprises in the entire country. 22 While it would likely
have been better for the average Georgian if the economic reforms had created more equitable
business and living conditions, the fact that large portions of the country’s wealth became
concentrated in the hands of a few does not preclude the possibility of the business elites or
oligarchs being able to challenge the state in support of a pro-democracy movement. Indeed,
Georgia’s independent television stations, owned by the oligarchs who rose to prominence in the
1990s, were hugely influential in spreading the pro-democracy messages that would influence
Georgians to take to the streets in support of the democratization movement being spearheaded
by Mikheil Saakashvili and his National Movement opposition party. 23
The economic and political reforms of the 1990s allowed the formation of the market
economy and the creation of a business class with enough resources to support causes that
undermined the authority of the state. In this case, the average Georgian was left behind, but the
dissatisfaction arising from economic hardship likely encouraged many Georgians to join the
pro-democracy protests once they began in Tbilisi. Georgia’s case shows that, even if
liberalizing economic reforms are slow to be implemented, they are still important for setting the
stage for democratization. Without the opposition messaging emanating from elite-owned
television stations, it is not likely that the democratization movement would have gained nearly
as much momentum as it did in 2003. Along with the independent station Rustavi-2, the Imedi
and Mze television stations, two elite-owned media outlets, shifted from supporting
Shevardnadze to more objective reporting that gradually encouraged the democratization
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movement and became the core of media coverage of the protests in Georgia. 24 Table 1 below
demonstrates the effects of these reforms in the years leading up to 2003, and the broader effects
of the 2003 protest movement on Georgia’s democratic and economic developments.
Table 1: Georgian Polity2 Score and Economic Freedom Index

Georgia
EF
Year
Polity2 Index
1996
4
44.1
1997
4
46.5
1998
4
47.9
1999
4
52.5
2000
2
54.3
2001
2
58.3
2002
2
56.7
2003
2
58.6
2004
6
58.9
2005
7
57.1
2006
7
64.5
2007
6
69.3
2008
6
69.2
2009
6
69.8
2010
6
70.4
2011
6
70.4
2012
6
69.4
2013
7
72.2
2014
7
72.6
2015
7
73
2016
7
72.6
2017
7
76
2018
7
76.2
Sources: Polity5 Annual Time-Series, 1946-2018 and Heritage Foundation 2021 Index of Economic Freedom

The Polity2 variable above refers to Georgia’s overall level of democracy on a composite
scale of -10 to +10, with -10 being more authoritarian and positive +10 being more democratic.
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The Economic Freedom Index (EF Index) evaluates the relative economic freedom of a country,
providing a useful history of the effects of the economic reforms of the 1990s and beyond. From
2000—2003, years in which Shevardnadze was in power, overall democracy in Georgia actually
degraded as Shevardnadze’s government became more authoritarian. After the mass protests
toppled Shevardnadze, Georgia became considerably more democratic and less authoritarian,
explaining the four-point jump between 2003 and 2004. Throughout all of this, economic
freedom (on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 being freer) in Georgia—brought on by its drastic
economic reforms—increased considerably, by 14.5 points by the time the protests began. Since
the protests, both Georgia’s Polity2 score and its Economic Freedom Index have continued to
increase, perhaps demonstrating a correlation between the relative economic freedom of a
country and its overall status of democracy.
Agency of Activists
The activists in Georgia were remarkably well organized. Kmara, a pro-democracy youth
movement modeled on Serbia’s Otpor youth movement, organized summer camps and seminars
that trained students in protest techniques -- skills they would have the chance to use only a few
months later.25 Kmara activists formed close working relationships with other opposition
movements, notably ISFED, the Liberty Institute, and of course Saakashvili’s National
Movement.26 Kmara also directly interacted with the Georgian security forces before the
fraudulent election of 2003 and the subsequent protests, building rapport among the ranks of the
police prior to the explosion of protests that would come later. 27 These all proved to be extremely
effective tactics when it came down to the street-level interactions between pro-democracy
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protesters and the police. The protesters were well-trained and organized, and the police had
already been exposed to Kmara and its message. The organization of Kmara and the
establishment of connections with the police likely are important factors as to why the protests
did not turn deadly.
In addition to Kmara’s growth and training of young activists, the political opposition
was also fairly well organized. Following the fraudulent elections, Mikheil Saakashvili’s
opposition party, National Movement, was also fairly well organized and was also able to inspire
protesters to come to its support in ousting Eduard Shevardnadze. Following several weeks of
protests, Saakashvili was able to lead protesters into the halls of the Georgian parliament, forcing
Shevardnadze to abandon his attempt to open a new session of parliament. 28 Shortly after the
protesters broke into the chambers of parliament, protesters took over other government
buildings, though opposition leader and head of parliament Nino Burdzhanadze said that this
other group of protesters would not enter any offices in the buildings they occupied. 29 This points
to a high degree of organization within the larger protest movement. That Burdzhanadze was
able to speak authoritatively on the actions of a group of protesters shows that the protests had
been well organized and operated with lots of cohesion between the opposition political leaders - Saaksashvili and Burdzhanadze -- and the protesters who were occupying buildings themselves.
Had the protests and activists been less organized, it is not as likely that the pro-democracy
protests would have been so successful so quickly. In Georgia’s case, the flat organizational
structure of Kmara, along with its training of activists, and the close collaboration between
protest groups and the political leaders of the opposition working to oust Shevardnadze, were
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important factors in what made the democratization movement so successful, at least with regard
to the street-level interactions between activists, civilians, police, and politicians.
Security Apparatus
The last of the endogenous factors that may play a role in the success of democratization
movements is the strength and effectiveness of the security apparatus. The Georgian security
apparatus of the 1990s was strained as it tried to manage a brief civil war and then separatist
wars in different parts of the country. By 2003, however, the burden of managing wars had
largely been lifted. Instead, the security forces in 2003 were faced with repressing protesters with
whom they had much in common. The political and economic woes that had caused thousands of
civilians to come out and protest affected everyone, even the army and police.
The security apparatus of Georgia in 2003 was not particularly fearsome or well-funded.
Years of conflict had taken their toll, and the Georgian economy was in no place to support large
expenditures for the operations of the army or police forces. The lack of funding for the security
apparatus was so dire that Shevardnadze’s regime had actually failed to pay the police for several
months before the protests broke out.30 Failing to pay the enforcers usually means that the
enforcers will lose their motivation to maintain order and protect the interests of the state, and
that is essentially what happened in Georgia in the early 2000s. Later on in the protests, some
members of the security forces actually defected and joined the protesters in calling for
Shevardnadze’s removal from office.31
The loyalty of the Georgian security forces to the Shevardnadze regime was not
particularly great. Immediately after protesters broke into the chambers of parliament and forced
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Shevardnadze to flee elsewhere, the Interior Minister, who was in charge of the police, said that
he and, by extension the police, would follow all of Shevarnadze’s orders. 32 While that may have
been reassuring for Shevardnadze to hear, it was not actually a statement that meant anything in
practice. During Shevardnadze’s years in power, the Georgian security apparatus had become
used to criticism and democratic pressures thanks to the semi-liberal regime. 33 By the time the
protests began, all of the Georgian security forces -- the army, police, and presidential guards -were internally split on the issue of whether or not they were willing to attack the civilians
protesting to demand democratization. 34 The “outreach” to the police conducted by Kmara may
have been a contributing factor to this split; when protesters chant “We are on your side,” it
normally becomes more difficult to justify striking out at them.
Exogenous Theories
International Linkages and Diffusion
The exogenous theories of democratization played a very important role in the formation
of Georgia’s democratization movement and helped ensure that the pro-democracy protests
enjoyed widespread support. Newly created connections between Georgia and the West enabled
the spread of democratic ideas across borders. Political liberalization and reform allowed for
non-governmental organizations to form and establish their own connections with prodemocracy activists and organizations across the world. Interactions between activist groups in
different countries also facilitated the spread of pro-democracy sentiments in Georgia.
Diffusion -- the spread of ideas, information, and tactics across borders -- is easy to see in
the Georgian case. Serbian Otpor activists met with Georgian pro-democracy activists (the
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Kmara youth movement in particular) to train them in protest and electoral techniques that would
help the Georgians replicate the successful push for democratization that occurred in Serbia
some years earlier.35 This meeting and training of activists proved to be a great help for the
democratization movement when the protests began. Georgian activists used the tactics and
techniques they had learned from their Serbian counterparts to help mobilize people to join the
protests and to begin interacting with the police, making it less likely that the police would attack
them during the protests.36 The tactics which had been successful in Serbia were also successful
in Georgia -- Kmara’s organizational structure and strategy of using humor to engage with the
general public prevented it from being targeted by pro-regime forces and helped break through
Georgians’ general political apathy, encouraging many to leave their homes and join the protests
in the streets of Tbilisi.37
The international linkages formed between Georgia and the democracies of the West may
have been even more important than the diffusion that occurred between the Serbian and
Georgian activist groups. Georgia had gradually increased its involvement with the West
throughout the 1990s, leading to Western pro-democracy NGOs and funds entering the country
for the first time. The involvement of pro-democracy international organizations and activist
groups emerging from these newfound opportunities and connections was exceptionally
important in the Georgian case.
Development aid targeted at media institutions in Georgia was particularly effective and
enabled the spread of pro-democracy ideas and the tactics learned from Otpor on a much larger
scale than if media outlets had not received financial support from Western organizations and
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governments. Rustavi-2, the “voice and vision of Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution,’” was an
extremely important independent media outlet that benefited from its relationships with the
Western NGOs Eurasia Foundation and Internews. 38 The guidance and resources provided by the
Western NGOs which worked with Rustavi-2 helped the news station resist Shevardnadze’s
attempts to shut it down because of its messaging in support of the political opposition. 39
Resisting the shutdown attempts of course allowed Rustavi-2 to continue its operations and
support pro-democracy activism throughout the entire country.
Other NGOs, both Georgian and Western, were also very involved in supporting the
democratization movement in the lead-up to the protests. The Liberty Institute, a Georgian NGO,
and George Soros’s Open Society Institute collaborated to send two Liberty Institute members to
Serbia to meet with Otpor activists and later helped Otpor activists visit Georgia to train
members of the Kmara youth movement.40 In addition to this involvement, the U.S. Agency for
International Development poured $1.5 million into computerizing Georgia’s voter rolls, and the
US and European governments contributed money to help fund election observers, who sounded
the alarm on the fraud that sparked the mass protests.41
Conclusion
The theories of democratization can easily be applied to Georgia’s pro-democracy
movement of 2003. The case of the Georgian people’s ousting of Eduard Shevardnadze in favor
of a more democratic government is the classic case of democratization upon which several
theories of democratization have been based. The endogenous theories surrounding the
economic and political reforms, agency of activists on the ground, and the strength and the
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effectiveness of the security apparatus can reasonably be used to understand what happened
domestically in Georgia. For the international side of things, the exogenous group of theories -international linkages and diffusion -- can also be successfully applied in the understanding of
Georgia’s democratization movement. Georgia is one of the first examples of a pro-democracy
protest movement succeeding in overthrowing a semi-authoritarian regime, and it has since
influenced the wider understanding of how democratization works in practice.
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Chapter 2: Protests in Kyrgyzstan
Following the dissolution of the USSR, the Central Asian republics gained independence
and immediately had to contend with the issues of building their own states and stable political
systems, something that they had not had to do during their years under Russian rule. The new
republics, in territories that were once a vital link in the global trade network, also had to decide
how they would orient their political and economic policies after years of northward-focused
trade with Russia and Soviet-directed collectivization. During this period in Kyrgyzstan, Askar
Akaev, a former professor turned deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, rose to the office
of president in October 1990 and initially spoke of creating a vibrant civil society in what was
probably the most “open” of the post-Soviet Central Asian republics. However, in the mid1990s, Akaev transitioned away from this rhetoric and instead focused on giving the state more
power to intervene against civil society organizations and prolong his time in office. 42 Akaev
was committed to economic reform—Kyrgyzstan rapidly liberalized its economy, and by 1996,
roughly two-thirds of the state-controlled sectors of the economy were in private hands. 43 These
reforms had the side effect of collapsing living standards for much of the population, however.
Still, Akaev maintained his increasingly authoritarian grip on Kyrgyzstan until 2005, when the
events of the so-called “Tulip Revolution” forced him out of power as protesters stormed
government buildings and demanded his resignation.44 This was the first time that the Kyrgyz
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people had overthrown their government in the hopes of establishing a more democratic state,
but it would not be the last.
After the upheaval of 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the former prime minister of
Kyrgyzstan and chairman of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan that contested the 2005
elections, became the second president of Kyrgyzstan. If Akaev’s regime had transitioned into a
competitive authoritarianism, Bakiyev’s style of governance was still harsher authoritarianism as
well.45 Bakiyev liked to use intimidation and force to suppress his growing list of enemies, but
by 2010, the blatant corruption and economic slowdown had drained his regime of most of its
legitimacy.46 The opposition, by now convinced of the need for genuine democratization,
launched large-scale protests that eventually drove Bakiyev out of power, paving the way for a
provisional government and new elections. 47
Ten years later, a new protest movement emerged after members of the political
opposition disputed the results of the October 2020 parliamentary elections, which were claimed
to be rigged.48 The president, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, declared a state of emergency as the
protests continued, government buildings were stormed, troops deployed, and election results
annulled.49 Amidst the chaos, Sadyr Japarov, who had been freed from his jail cell by a group of
protesters, was chosen to be the new prime minister, and president Jeenbekov announced his
resignation.
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Kyrgyzstan certainly has a strong recent history of protests and overthrowing
governments relatively quickly. It took around two weeks from the beginning of the 2020
protests for the government to collapse and President Jeenbekov to resign, pointing to existing
conditions of Kyrgyz civil society, the economy, and generally effective protest mobilization as
factors for why the 2020 protest movement was so successful, even as the Belarusian protests of
a few months prior failed.
Endogenous Theories
Postcommunist Economic and Political Reforms
The first post-independence government of Kyrgyzstan, led by President Akaev, sought
to make deep, radical changes to the Soviet command economy that persisted in Kyrgyzstan.
This was in line with the aims of several of the other newly independent post-Soviet countries,
although Kyrgyzstan’s economic transition was not exactly the same as Georgia’s or Russia’s.
The Kyrgyz government was at first torn on how to approach the necessary economic reforms. It
eventually settled on a policy to liberalize and decentralize the economy, not unlike the “shock
therapy” reforms carried out in Georgia, Russia, and other post-Soviet countries. 50 By 1996,
roughly two-thirds of the public sector had been transferred into private hands, a remarkably
quick turnaround.51 As in the other countries, independence and the introduction of the new
reforms devastated Kyrgyzstan’s economy in the short-to-mid-term, with standards of living
falling and unemployment rising. Table 2, shown on the next page, illustrates the overall trend of
democratization in Kyrgyzstan and the economic liberalization that developed alongside it over
the course of the last 20 years. The level of economic freedom in Kyrgyzstan has stayed fairly
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stable since 2005, when the Polity2 score (a stand-in for overall levels of democracy) spiked
upwards by six points, while Kyrgyzstan’s Polity2 score continued to trend upwards, indicating
greater democratization. Though no data is available for the years 2019 and 2020, it is likely that
Kyrgyzstan’s Polity2 scores would have dropped as the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan
(SDPK) consolidated its power and suppressed political opponents and critics. 52
Table 2: Kyrgyz Polity2 Score and Economic Freedom Index

Kyrgyzstan
Year
Polity2
1998
-3
1999
-3
2000
-3
2001
-3
2002
-3
2003
-3
2004
-3
2005
3
2006
4
2007
3
2008
3
2009
1
2010
4
2011
7
2012
7
2013
7
2014
7
2015
7
2016
7
2017
8
2018
8

EF
Index
51.8
54.8
55.7
53.7
51.7
56.8
58
56.6
61
60.2
61.1
61.8
61.3
61.1
60.2
59.6
61.1
61.3
59.6
61.1
62.8

Sources: Polity5 Annual Time-Series, 1946-2018 and Heritage Foundation 2021 Index of Economic Freedom
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While the shock therapy reforms introduced by Akaev’s government in the 1990s
hollowed out much of the Kyrgyz economy and made things much more difficult for the average
citizen, there were of course elites who benefited from the liberalization of the economy. Kyrgyz
political and economic elites, often exercising great influence over certain regions of the
ethnically divided country, were instrumental in the first of Kyrgyzstan’s great political
upheavals—the 2005 “Tulip Revolution.” The regional elites of Kyrgyzstan stoked anger against
the government and the outcome of the 2005 parliamentary elections, mobilizing their
supporters, mainly people from rural areas of Kyrgyzstan, and were eventually successful in
ousting the Akaev regime.53 The decentralized nature of political patronage networks and the
north-south regional rivalries present in Kyrgyzstan were important in both the 2005 and 2010
political upheavals that ousted Akaev and later Bakiyev. In the aftermath of the 2010 protests,
Kyrgyzstan adopted a new constitution that transformed it from a presidential democracy and
into a parliamentary democracy. 54 Kyrgyzstan also has a diverse landscape of independent media
outlets, though there are still some glaring issues that affect journalists and bloggers. 55 Overall
though, the spread of information is not as restricted in Kyrgyzstan as it might be in other, more
authoritarian countries, enabling the faster spread and acceptance of the democratic ideals that
inspired the major protest movements in Kyrgyzstan.
Agency of Activists
The Kyrgyz protests were not necessarily organized, at least not in the same way that
they were in Georgia. There was no Kyrgyz equivalent of the Georgian Kmara youth movement
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to learn protest tactics and encourage other people to join the protests. That kind of knowledge
had already been developed -- the revolutions in 2005 and 2010 had worked for a reason, and
many Kyrgyz had not forgotten the lessons learned during those years. The kind of mass
mobilization that it would take to oust the government had been done before, and the residual
knowledge of how to motivate people to pour out into the streets, even during the height of the
Covid-19 pandemic, was still there.56
Social media, ever present in 2020, played a large role in getting the word out about the
electoral fraud of the October 5th elections. Opposition leaders, activists, and political
commentators used the microblogging platform Twitter for most of their discourse about the
fraud and the protests. Some were very cynical about the government’s actions, even as the
elections were still going on. Azamat Akeneev, the deputy chairman of the opposition Reform
party, wrote on October 5th, “...they will bring and register hundreds of thousands of purchased
[voters] here to steal from Bishkek residents their choice” in the city’s elections. 57 Clearly, the
opposition did not have much faith in the electoral process under President Jeenbekov’s regime.
Social media was also used to reach foreign audiences as activists sought to bring the prodemocracy protests into the international spotlight: one tweet which was retweeted by a young
activist in Bishkek reads “To everyone here in the UK, there is a massive unrest happening right
now in Bishkek, capital of Kyrgyzstan following an election yesterday. All my mind is there
right now. This plus Covid-19 is a bad combination.” 58
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Security Apparatus
The last of the endogenous factors that may play a role in the success of democratization
movements is the strength and effectiveness of the security apparatus. The Kyrgyz security
apparatus is not a particularly strong organization -- certainly not strong enough to keep
protestors out of government buildings like the Kyrgyz parliament building and the president’s
administrative offices.59 The 2005 and 2010 protest movements and their successes in
overthrowing the regimes are a testament to the relative weakness of the security forces in
Kyrgyzstan.
In addition, the Kyrgyz security apparatus is not particularly well-funded, and its attitude
towards pro-democracy dissidents and protestors is nowhere near as hostile as the security
apparatuses of Belarus or Russia. Kyrgyzstan is a relatively poor country, and there are no oil
rents to fund state activities and the security forces. Coupled with the Covid-19 pandemic
severely disrupting the global economy, this lack of economic resources and funding meant that
things were likely more strained among the rank and file of the security forces than usual.
Exogenous Theories
International Linkages and Diffusion
Kyrgyzstan is often thought of as a bastion of democracy surrounded by dictatorships or
similarly authoritarian states. While it would make sense to assume that Kyrgyzstan’s democratic
development might have been hampered by its proximity to authoritarianism under the
predictions of the exogenous theories, Kyrgyzstan has managed to maintain a comparatively
more democratic style of governance as compared to its immediate neighbors. After the fall of
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the Soviet Union, new connections formed between the West and the newly independent
republics -- in Kyrgyzstan’s case, the political and economic liberalization reforms attracted
Western investment and non-governmental organizations. These conditions are what helped
create popular support for previous Kyrgyz “revolutions,” and they likely contributed to this
most recent government overthrow.
Diffusion in the Kyrgyz case is more about the spread of ideas and information than
about the training of Kyrgyz activists by activists from another country. For most of the last
decade, Kyrgyzstan has been surrounded by other authoritarian regimes, and it could be expected
that the Kyrgyz government (prior to the events of 2020) might learn a thing or two from them
about how to maintain a firm grip on power. However, it appears that this exchange of
authoritarian mechanisms did not fully take place, or if it did, then it did not take place fast
enough to have any meaningful impact on the outcome of the protest movement. It is also
important to note that the Belarusian protests had taken place only a few months before the
Kyrgyz protests began, and many Kyrgyz surely knew about and sympathized with the
Belarusian protesters as well, given the abundance of social media posts focusing on the
Belarusian protests. Especially on Twitter, many users spoke about the events in Belarus and
compared them to the events in Kyrgyzstan.60
The international linkages formed between Kyrgyzstan and the democracies of the West
were very important in the development of pro-democracy support in Kyrgyzstan. In the early
years of independence, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), greatly influenced by the
“Washington consensus” of the 1990s and 2000s, gave Kyrgyzstan a significant amount of
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financial support, creating an important link to international organizations and development
funds.61 In addition to the sudden influx of IMF money, Western NGOs also flooded into
Kyrgyzstan and began pushing for reforms in many different sectors of society and politics, with
around one thousand such NGOs operating by the early 2000s. 62 Many of these NGOs have
remained active in the Kyrgyz civic and political spheres, helping to maintain important links
with other democracies outside the region, although some NGOs have reported harassment over
the issues they seek to address or perceived government favoritism. 63 It is also important to note
that on a geopolitical level, Kyrgyzstan is similar to Belarus in that it is vulnerable to external
Western influences but also insulated from them by its close ties to Russia. The effects of having
closer ties to Russia -- the concept of “authoritarian diffusion” -- are perhaps a more recent
phenomenon as the political landscape of Kyrgyzstan changed following the 2010 upheavals.
Some linkages between Kyrgyzstan and Western nations were weakened within the last decade.
For example, a United States military base was closed in 2014, and in 2015, President
Atambayev ended a cooperation agreement with the US.64 However, NGOs were largely
unaffected by this worsening of relations with the US, and most are still operational.
Conclusion
The 2020 Kyrgyz protest movement’s success can be understood through the existing
theories of democratization. The endogenous theories relating to economic and political reforms,
agency of activists in the streets, and the strength, loyalty, and effectiveness of the security
apparatus can be used to reasonably describe what happened for the domestic side of
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democratization within Kyrgyzstan. The exogenous theories dealing with international linkages
and diffusion, can also aid in understanding the case of Kyrgyzstan in 2020. Kyrgyzstan has in
the past provided examples of these theories in action during the previous government oustings,
and 2020 appears to be no exception.
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Part II: Protest Movement Failures
Just as other democratization movements across Europe and the former Soviet Union had
taken hold and ushered in new political eras in each country, other pro-democracy movements
were being quashed. The semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes of the former Soviet
Union had learned from the events in countries where new democracies had been established,
taking notes on how best to protect themselves from nascent democratization movements in their
own countries. Azerbaijan serves as a good example. In 2005 Ilham Aliyev’s regime prevented
prominent opposition leaders from returning to Azerbaijan, confiscated “orange material” -- the
pro-democracy Orange Revolution in Ukraine had only happened a year earlier -- to prevent
mass opposition mobilization, and used the incredibly loyal security forces to break up
opposition meetings and rallies.65 Other regimes have learned the same lessons and taken similar
actions as the regime in Azerbaijan. The tactics adopted by semi-authoritarian and authoritarian
regimes have prevented the development of new connections with the democratic West, slowed
the reform of political-economic structures, and disrupted the organization and mobilization of
pro-democracy activists. These disruptions to democratization, at least in relation to the existing
theories, may help explain why some pro-democracy movements have failed.
The exogenous theories of democratization play an important role in understanding the
development of the newly independent countries across the former USSR as Western
democracies pushed for the spread of democratic ideals in the region. As time wore on however,
regimes across the former USSR, fearful of democratization movements threatening their grip on
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power, restricted the vehicles for Western, pro-democracy influence that had proved so important
in other countries. Regimes turned to the strict regulation of non-governmental organizations and
their finances to make promoting democracy all the more difficult, both for foreign NGOs and
domestic ones that received donations from abroad. 66 New regulations aimed at stifling the
activities of pro-democracy NGOs denied them the chance to influence civil society and form
connections with pro-democracy activists.
The diffusion of pro-democracy ideas and activism tactics is similarly impacted.
Organizations that attempted to mimic organizations like the Serbian Otpor or Georgian Kmara
were actively suppressed and new, pro-regime organizations were created -- Nashi in Russia and
Zhaz Otan in Kazakhstan, for example.67 In addition, foreign activists -- those who might have
the expertise to help train other pro-democracy activists -- have also been denied entry into
countries with more repressive regimes. 68 The international reach of successful pro-democracy
movements in other countries like Serbia and Ukraine is now much more limited in some
authoritarian regimes as suppression tactics disrupt pro-democracy activist organizations at
home, foreign activists with knowledge of protest and mobilization tactics are denied entry to the
country, and state-backed groups compete for support from the general public.
The endogenous group of theories which helps explain the domestic conditions in which
protests occur is also important to examine. The agency of activists is perhaps the most clear-cut
theory in this group, as its predictions are easily seen in practice. For successful democratization
movements, activists are often well-organized and persuasive to the general public, allowing
activists to mobilize large numbers of people to protest with them. In countries where
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authoritarian regimes have learned from the events of earlier democratization movements in
other countries, however, regimes have taken great pains to disrupt the operations of activist
groups. The regimes have essentially reduced the agency of activists, limiting their potential for
organizing a grassroots democratization movement.
The postcommunist economic and political reforms undertaken by a country are also
important in creating the conditions for protest movements. Theoretically countries which
liberalized their economies and allowed the formation of a wealthy business elite are more likely
to transition to democracies, though this is not always the case. Several countries drastically
reformed their economies through “shock therapy” reforms, creating a new class of business
elites who could justifiably be called oligarchs. Others chose limited reform or virtually no
reform at all. In countries with liberalized economies but authoritarian regimes, the business
elites that could have challenged the regime through their significant political and economic
influence even if they were not truly pro-democracy, have been subordinated by their regimes, as
has happened in Russia and other countries. 69 In countries that have only implemented limited
reforms or where the oligarchic/business elite is not as strongly developed, as in Belarus or
Kazakhstan, the interests of the elites have likewise been subordinated to the interests of the
state.70 The economic influence of business elites or oligarchs thus does not always translate into
political influence, limiting their effectiveness in challenging aspects of authoritarian regimes
and whatever political or economic liberalization they may have been able to promote.
The effectiveness of the state security apparatus depends on the political realities of the
state it serves. Large, well-funded security organizations are predictably much more well
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equipped to suppress democratization movements than ones that are small or underfunded. The
loyalty and cohesion of the security apparatus is also important. A security apparatus that is loyal
to a regime is often one of the pillars of power for authoritarian strongmen. Postcommunist
economic and political reforms cannot be ignored either. The regimes in Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan, neither of which completely privatized their economies and instead relied on oil
rents to fund state activities, were able to use their well-funded security apparatus to repress even
serious attempts at democratization.71 Additionally, security organizations loyal to authoritarian
regimes are not known for “playing nice” with political dissidents or activists. The use of force,
then, is a more readily available option for the riot police and special units that are deployed to
quell the protests.
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Chapter 3: Putinism and Russia’s ‘Illiberal Democracy’
Initially, Russia’s government, led by President Boris Yelstin during the 1990s, turned
towards market liberalization and the idea of democracy, though there were some who resisted
reforming Russia’s economy and cumbersome political institutions left over from the Soviet
era.72 The reforms were eventually pushed through, and they saw limited success. While
Russia’s economy rapidly transformed into a market economy during the 1990s, it also became
extremely volatile, making it difficult for average citizens to get by and somewhat
delegitimizing the new political institutions being put in place. These circumstances are what led
to President Boris Yeltsin’s unexpected resignation and Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. Despite
the difficulty Russia faced during its transition to democracy, it remained the major economic
and military power of the former Soviet Union, and this legacy has likely influenced Russia’s
political culture at all levels.
After ascending to the presidency at the end of the 1990s, Vladimir Putin has sought to
maintain control and relative political stability for the last two decades. Even when Putin served
as prime minister (to reset his term limits for the presidency), his hand-picked successor, Dmitri
Medvedev, was little more than a puppet of Putin’s overall political position, although he did
create certain expectations for a more liberal style of governance that were eventually quashed
as Putin signaled his return to the presidency. 73 Under Putin and Medvedev, the Russian
government turned into a quasi-authoritarian state or “hybrid regime,” which tolerates
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opposition parties--so long as they do not upset the status quo--and uses a variety of repressive
tactics to maintain social control.74 These political conditions, especially the crushing of any
hope that there may be a more liberal style of governance in the future, set the stage for the 2011
protests that took place in Russia’s major cities.
In the December 2011 Russian State Duma elections, reports of blatant election fraud
emerged and quickly spread online and in the news, galvanizing support for the opposition and
inspiring protests. The opposition parties quickly organized themselves into a broader coalition
of both the “old” and “new” oppositionists, smoothing over any disagreements on policy
matters. A protest movement was born. The protest movement called for new, fair elections, the
release of political prisoners, and a more general turn towards democracy. Unfortunately for the
opposition, this new protest movement failed -- opposition leaders were quickly arrested, and
the protests were crushed by riot police. Vladimir Putin has since maintained his grip on power
in Russia, using the appearance of democracy to legitimize his authoritarian style of governance.
Endogenous Theories
Postcommunist Economic and Political Reforms
Russia differs from most of the other former Soviet republics in that it is the only one that
has maintained a large economy, a powerful military, and its global presence. Despite the initial
chaos of the 1990s, Russia has maintained influence and power over the rest of the former Soviet
Union, which Russia considers its geopolitical backyard. As the heavyweight of the former
Soviet Union, Russia’s political and economic activities often have consequences beyond its own
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borders, which has both empowered the regime and forced it to come to terms with the “risks” of
allowing too much reform or democratization.
Russia’s economic reforms had established a fairly successful and dynamic market
economy by the turn of the millennium, but it was dominated by the fabulously wealthy
oligarchs who made their fortunes (not always legally) in the 1990s. These oligarchs, by virtue of
their economic dominance, also wielded significant political influence -- Boris Yeltsin
essentially struck a deal with the oligarchs to secure his re-election in the mid 1990s. While this
development might have theoretically supported pluralism and democracy in Russia, Vladimir
Putin was eager to end the political power exercised by the oligarchs once he ascended to the
presidency. In 2000, Putin offered an unwritten pact to the oligarchs: if they paid taxes and did
not exercise their political power against Putin, the state would respect their property rights and
allow them to keep their assets.75 Putin later enforced this pact in 2003, arresting the oligarch
owner of the Yukos oil company Mikhail Khodorovsky and seizing the company’s assets for
criticizing Putin’s regime and supporting opposition parties and media outlets. 76 The
Khodorovsky affair showed the other oligarchs that Putin was serious. Most oligarchs have since
abided by the unwritten pact and have relinquished their political influence in return for being
allowed to keep their wealth.77 Through cases like this, Putin has effectively neutralized the
oligarchs who might once have challenged his grip on power, eliminating a possible avenue for
democratic pressures to reach the Russian government.
Russia’s economy was, and still is, heavily dependent on its energy sector and on two
resources in particular: oil and gas. In 2011, Russia’s exports were worth $616 billion, with
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roughly $385 billion being resource and energy exports; 93.92 percent of these exports were
directly related to the petroleum industry, followed by coal at a comparatively miniscule 3.68
percent.78 The overwhelming dominance of the petroleum industry in Russia’s exports and the
wider economy as a whole has informed the regime’s decision-making, and has for the most part
enabled it to pour money into activities deemed important to protecting the regime. In addition to
its dependence on oil rents, the regime began to increase its share in the energy sector and other
important, high-value economic sectors such as aviation or shipbuilding and the financial sector
in the 2000s.79 The state’s growing interest in key parts of the economy has certainly provided
more revenue for the regime to fund anti-democratic activities, but it has also led to economic
inefficiencies that may harm Russia’s economy overall. Still, the state control, or at least
significant state presence, in various high-value economic sectors and industries gave the regime
ample resources to silence oligarch critics and fund anti-democratic groups and security forces.
On the next page, Table 3 shows the relative levels of economic freedom and democracy in
Russia from 1995 to 2018. Notably, the economic freedom index rating for Russia never reaches
quite the same level as Georgia, or even Kyrgyzstan, in any of the years. The Polity2 score,
representing democracy, spikes in 2000, when Putin became president, but decreases in 2007 and
2008, right before his position-switch with Dmitri Medvedev to get around constitutional term
limits. The values for both measures in 2010, 2011, and 2012, all remained very stable, even in
the wake of the 2011 protests. Perhaps the Russian state’s style of governance, and especially its
repression tactics used against the protestors, are behind this period of stagnation in the scores.
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As the table shows, nothing significant changed. The regime was clearly able to protect its own
power and prevent any meaningful reforms from being implemented during those years.
Table 3: Russian Polity2 Score and Economic Freedom Index

Russia
EF
Year
Polity2 Index
1995
5
51.1
1996
3
51.6
1997
3
48.6
1998
3
52.8
1999
3
54.5
2000
6
51.8
2001
6
49.8
2002
6
48.7
2003
6
50.8
2004
6
52.8
2005
6
51.3
2006
6
52.4
2007
4
52.2
2008
4
49.8
2009
4
50.8
2010
4
50.3
2011
4
50.5
2012
4
50.5
2013
4
51.1
2014
4
51.9
2015
4
52.1
2016
4
50.6
2017
4
57.1
2018
4
58.2
Sources: Polity5 Annual Time-Series, 1946-2018 and Heritage Foundation 2021 Index of Economic Freedom

Agency of Activists
The 2011 protests in Russia were primarily organized and announced on social media
platforms like Vkontakte and Facebook and on blogging platforms like LiveJournal. Opposition
leaders who were already popular at the time were able to quickly send announcements to their
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followers and gain new ones as the evidence of election fraud became public. Social media
allowed for much quicker responses from the activists who were organizing the protests and
from the general public. The first of the protests against the results of the State Duma elections
actually was only announced on the day it was to occur -- Aleksei Naval’nyi, an opposition
figure who had a relatively large following at the time of the protests, published a post on
LiveJournal his plans for holding a demonstration that night, accusing the government and
electoral officials of being crooks and thieves. 80 This is likely one of the first instances where a
relatively large, impromptu demonstration was able to be organized without the aid of traditional
media outlets like television or radio stations.
In addition to the internet being a much faster way for word to travel about the protests,
the opposition activists also came together to oppose the results of the election, organizing joint
protests. Boris Nemtsov, a prominent opposition politician, gave a detailed account of the first
major protest, wrote that “[the opposition activists] are united by the understanding that these
elections are a fraud and a farce. And the main victory of the opposition is that this
understanding has become nationwide.” 81 This is an important point -- the opposition had
coalesced around a common goal, even if different factions preferred other strategies for
protesting. Nemtsov goes on to say in the same post that roughly 300 people were detained after
the rally, with most of those being held overnight. 82 Detaining protesters, and particularly the
opposition leaders who organized the rallies and protests, would become a major strategy for the
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regime, as it tried to disrupt the protests already going on and prevent new ones from being
organized.

Security Apparatus
The Russian security apparatus has a long history of suppressing dissent and helping
maintain political and social control in the country. The intelligence and security services are
loyal to the state (and more specifically to Putin) and are often willing to use force to suppress
protests. They are also well-funded compared to their counterparts in other former Soviet
republics -- the oil rents upon which much of the Russian state budget depends certainly have
helped make sure that the police and special response units are never under-equipped or disloyal
over payment withholdings.
When protests do arise, the OMON special response units are often mobilized. The
OMON units have gained a reputation for being the “stormtroopers of repression” and for being
ruthlessly efficient.83 The OMON were deployed to Bolotnaya Square in 2011, and they quickly
lived up to their reputation as brutally efficient riot police. In the beginning days of the protest,
thousands of police, among them the OMON, were deployed to Moscow in preparation for the
protests. There, police chased off protesters and detained those they were able to catch, violently
throwing them into police vans. 84 A number of opposition leaders were arrested on the first night
of the protests--Ilya Yashin and Alexei Navalny both were sentenced to fifteen days in jail after
being arrested on December 5th.85 After serving the fifteen days in jail, Navalny wrote a blog
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post encouraging the protesters and saying that he will continue to organize protests. 86 During
one of his protest marches (supposed to end at Lubyanka Square), protesters were “grabbed by
riot police, thrown against walls, or tackled to the ground and then dragged along the wet
street.”87 In another protest organized by Navalny in May 2012, after Putin won the presidential
election, violence once again broke out between riot police and protesters, ending with more than
six hundred protesters detained, more than fifty hospitalized, and many more injured. 88While
many Russians were probably undaunted by the prospect of being arrested at a protest, probably
more people were discouraged from even going to the protests because of the response from the
security forces.
Exogenous Theories
International Linkages and Diffusion
While the Western democracies may have significant influence over smaller, weaker
countries that can be susceptible to democratization movements, they do not have very much
leverage over Russia. Russia is a large, powerful country that has shown itself to not be
intimidated by sanctions or other threats often used by Western powers to influence other
countries and, to borrow a phrase from Levitsky and Way, “raise the cost of repression” to such a
degree that democratization may be encouraged. 89
There are five dimensions to international linkages as they relate to the West: economic,
geopolitical, social, communication, and transnational civil society linkages. 90 Russia, while

86

Aleksei Naval’nyi, “(no subject),” LiveJournal, accessed April 17, 2021, https://navalny.livejournal.com/2011/12/
21/.
87
Masha Gessen, The Future is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia (New York: Riverhead Books,
2017), 336.
88
Gessen, The Future is History, 362.
89
Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” 22.
90
Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” 22-23.

47
exporting large amounts of petroleum-based products to countries in European Union, it imports
substantially more products from authoritarian states such as China (21.33% of total imports in
2018) and Belarus (5.73% of total imports in 2018) than it does from Western democracies like
Germany (13.93% of total imports in 2018).91 The economic linkages between Russia and the
West are likely not significant enough to influence any meaningful amount of democratization in
Russia. Geopolitical linkages between Russia and the West are likewise limited; Russia’s
participation in Western-led alliances and organizations are limited, and Russia has formed its
own international organizations (such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization and
Eurasian Economic Union), which serve as geopolitical counterweights to Western organizations
like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union.
Social linkages, related to tourism, migration, and elite education in the West, are harder
to measure, but tourism statistics from 2014 show that Russian citizens do often travel to nearby
countries that are associated with the West: millions of Russians traveled to nearby Finland (no.
1 destination), Estonia (no.7), Poland (no. 9), and Germany (no. 10). 92 However, Western
tourists do not visit Russia on the same scale; Poland and Finland were the only Western or
Western-associated countries in the top ten tourist origin countries in 2014. 93 Communications
linkages--those created from telecommunications, Internet connections, and Western-media
penetration--are less obviously influential. While Western social media companies such as
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Twitter and Facebook do increase political awareness and general support for democracy in
authoritarian regimes and sometimes become organizing platforms for opposition movements,
the market share of these companies is often very low--in Russia in 2011 to 2012, only about
seven percent of Russian adults used Twitter or Facebook. 94 Transnational civil society linkages
-- ties to international NGOs, party organizations, and other networks -- were somewhat
restricted in Russia in 2011, due to Russia’s restrictive law on foreign NGOs. While the
extremely restrictive version of the law was amended in 2009, the requirements left in place
significantly affected the capacity of NGOs to do their work. 95
In short, Russia is largely resistant to any leverage that the West could use to promote
democracy there. It is a large, militarily powerful country that is not as susceptible to Western
pressures as some smaller, weaker countries perhaps are. Its linkages with the West are likewise
limited: Russia is not solely economically dependent on the West and its geopolitical goals are
often in opposition to those of the West. Its social linkages are difficult to measure and likely not
altogether that important, and its communications linkages--to Western social media companies,
for example--are often drowned out by domestic companies. Russia’s transnational civil society
linkages are also limited, in large part because of restrictions on foreign NGOs put in place in the
mid-late 2000s.
Conclusion
The 2011 protest movement in Russia failed for a number of reasons that can be
understood through the lens of the theories of democratization. The endogenous theories can be
very clearly seen as being negated in Russia’s case. First, despite the economic and political
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reforms introduced in the 1990s, the business/oligarch class that might have supported or
financed the democratization movement was firmly under the thumb of Putin’s regime. Second,
Russia’s security forces proved more than willing to suppress the protests through the use of
force and arbitrary detentions and arrests. The exogenous theories likewise have been somewhat
negated by the decision and anti-democratic actions taken by Putin and his supporters in the
government. Russia’s linkages with the West were somewhat limited and governed largely by
economic and geopolitical considerations often in opposition to Western democracies;
democracy-promoting NGOs likewise were restricted in their operational capacities because of
this. Had some of these conditions been different, then it is possible that the pro-democracy
protests would have been successful, or at least not so effectively crushed.
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Chapter 4: Lukashenko’s Fragile Authoritarianism
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus became an independent
country. In the early 1990s, Communist party officials, who were still in charge of the postSoviet Belarusian government, largely resisted major reforms to Belarus’s economy and political
institutions, although there was a significant amount of pro-democracy activism and the creation
and proliferation of political parties from 1991 to 1993. 96 In 1993, a new constitution that called
for the election of Belarus’s first president was ratified, and the election date was set for 23 June
1994. During the election, the two candidates who supported democratic reforms polled at a
combined 23 percent of the vote, showing that there was a significant amount of support for
market reforms and democratization among the voting population. 97 Aleksandr Lukashenko, a
former Communist Party official at various collective and state farms, won a runoff election with
80.1 percent of the vote.98 He remains the president of Belarus to this day, and under his rule
Belarus has seen the least political and social reform out of any former Soviet republic.
In the years following Lukashenko’s ascension to the presidency, there were a number of
civil demonstrations and protests against the increasingly repressive actions of the Lukashenko
government. On 26 April 1996, a commemoration march for the tenth anniversary of the
Chernobyl disaster which was opposition-dominated (though not organized by the opposition)
turned violent when Ukrainian militia group of nationalist extremists began assaulting the crowd,
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and the day ended with some 204 people arrested, among them 17 of the militia who initiated the
violent exchange.99 A few weeks later in May, further demonstrations were met with police and
militia violence against demonstrators. During the November 1996 protests against
Lukashenko’s proposed changes to the constitution, protesters were again suppressed through the
use of force, and a referendum saw Lukashenko’s proposed changes go through, giving
Lukashenko far more power. After this crisis, Lukashenko’s position at the top of an increasingly
authoritarian regime was cemented. Authoritarian and anti-democratic measures, such as the
silencing of the opposition press and the normalization of electoral irregularities, soon followed.
After the 2006 presidential election was deemed to have been neither free nor fair, citizens took
to the streets of Minsk to protest the results, but they were quickly dispersed by riot police who
arrested between 500 and 1000 people, 392 of whom were subsequently sentenced. 100
The most recent protest movement in Belarus was sparked by the results of the
presidential election that was held on August 9, 2020. The election was marred by claims of
electoral fraud and the outright bans of opposition candidates, which encouraged protestors to
take to the streets in the aftermath of the election. The protest movement’s main goals were to
overturn the election results and to hold new elections that were free and fair. This protest
movement, while still somewhat active, no longer sees the same widespread public action that it
did in the days and weeks immediately following the August election. In addition, the main goals
of the protests have not been achieved. Aleksandr Lukashenko, despite the scores of protesters
calling for his resignation, is still the president of Belarus, and no elections have been held since
the presidential election in August.
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Endogenous Theories
Postcommunist Economic and Political Reforms
Belarus differs from the other countries being examined in that it did not drastically
reform its economy in the years following its independence. Aleksandr Lukashenko, president
since 1994, may have initially presented himself as a reformer and man of the people, but in
practice he proved himself to be neither of these things.101 Generally, countries that quickly and
drastically reformed their economies into market economies, allowing the creation of an
independent business class whose interests are not entirely dictated by the state, are more likely
to be democratic. While some limited economic reforms, aimed at privatizing state-owned
enterprises and encouraging private entrepreneurship, were attempted in Belarus, they did not
last very long on account of Lukashenko’s aversion to real reform. Today, state-owned
enterprises account for roughly half of the Belarusian GDP and around sixty percent of
employment.102 This high level of state involvement in the economy gives the state a decisive
advantage when it comes to dealing with protests. Protesters or opposition sympathizers who
work for state-owned industries--as many Belarusians do, given the scale of state economic
involvement--have fewer resources to “finance the organization of mobilization” and instead
have to rely simply on the courage of individuals to organize the protests. 103
In addition, in countries without a major independent business class, protestors have a
much more difficult time attracting elites to help finance and organize protests. 104 While state
owned enterprises dominate the Belarusian economy as a whole, there is still an active private
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sector. However, it faces an “unfair competitive environment, and [private firms] are harassed by
bureaucrats.”105 Private entrepreneurs lack the same level of access to political power and state
resources that are common in other post-Soviet countries. 106 This lack of political power and
general economic influence can help explain why the 2020 protests in Belarus have failed: the
protests rely on normal people for organization, but those who would organize or join in the
protests do not have sufficient financial backing to make sustaining the protests feasible. The
private firms that do exist are already dogged by state intervention and competition. Economic
and political power in Belarus and firmly in the hands of the state.
Given that the state has immense control over the economy as a whole, it is no surprise
that most of the media and journalism sectors are either under direct state control or under
immense state pressure. State-owned broadcasters are the only ones that broadcast nationwide
and are able to reach the whole of Belarus’s population, and all of them spread propaganda for
Lukashenko and the state.107 While the internet has relieved some of the anti-democratic pressure
coming from the regime, it is primarily used by younger Belarusians and has also had restrictions
placed on it. Laws introduced in 2009 and 2010 created obstacles for independent journalists and
media outlets and restricted certain parts of the internet. 108 While some independent media
organizations have managed to continue their operations, others have been forced to shut down
or have moved operations to nearby countries. The regime has stamped out most media
organizations that would pose a direct threat to it, and those that are left have been forced to
leave the country, weakening their access to information and influence further.
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Table 4: Belarusian Polity2 Score and Economic Freedom Index

Belarus
EF
Year
Polity2 Index
1995
0
40.4
1996
-7
38.7
1997
-7
39.8
1998
-7
38
1999
-7
35.4
2000
-7
41.3
2001
-7
38
2002
-7
39
2003
-7
39.7
2004
-7
43.1
2005
-7
46.7
2006
-7
47.5
2007
-7
47
2008
-7
45.3
2009
-7
45
2010
-7
48.7
2011
-7
47.9
2012
-7
49
2013
-7
48
2014
-7
50.1
2015
-7
49.8
2016
-7
48.8
2017
-7
58.6
2018
-7
58.1
Sources: Polity5 Annual Time-Series, 1946-2018 and Heritage Foundation 2021 Index of Economic Freedom

Table 4 above shows the extreme authoritarianism of Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus. In
the early 1990s, there might have been some hope for democratic reform. In 1995, the year
Lukashenko was able to modify the constitution and further consolidate power, the Polity2 score
sits at zero. One year later, it drops all the way to -7 and has remained at that level ever since.
Belarus has by far the most authoritarian government of the four case studies; the others have
managed to maintain a positive Polity2 score for most of their recent histories. Economic
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freedom is also fairly low in Belarus when compared to the other case studies. In this respect, it
is most comparable to Russia, where the 2011 protest movement failed. This trend of unending
authoritarianism certainly continued into 2020. It should be no surprise that Lukashenko actively
repressed the protests when his extreme authoritarianism has kept him in power for so long.
Agency of Activists
The activists on the ground in Belarus were relatively well organized, though their
methods of organization and attracting supporters to join their marches and demonstrations
differed from those used in other democratization movements. Notably, the Belarusian
democratization movement did not rely on rallies during its marches. This organizational
decision served to promote other protest tactics in which the protesters participated as equals,
such as the many marches and human chains that were a part of the broader democratization
movement.109 In addition, the relatively few prominent opposition leaders frequently address
their supporters in a way that foregrounds their own agency as citizens and protesters, rather than
speaking for them or using a “rally around the flag” approach. 110 This approach emphasized the
role of protesters as activists and representatives as a larger pro-democracy movement, rather
than just supporters of a certain opposition political faction or figure. 111 In this form of
organization, the Belarusian protests were not unlike the ones in Georgia. Both used a relatively
flat organizational structure centered around the activism and agency of individual citizens.
As in Kyrgyzstan, social media played an important role in the organization and
mobilization of protests, although this organization took place on other platforms for the most
part. The most important social media platform during the 2020 pro-democracy protests was
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likely the messaging platform Telegram, where users can both message each other privately and
join large channels where announcements and other updates can be made to thousands of users at
once. While there were certainly other platforms involved, the regime greatly restricted internet
traffic as the protests began, limiting where people could get information about the
democratization movement -- Telegram was one of the only major platforms that continued
working during the regime’s internet blackouts. 112 NEXTA, an opposition media organization
based in Warsaw, operated several channels that were instrumental in disseminating information
to Belarusians and international observers. One Telegram channel, NEXTA Live, quickly grew
to over one million users who were all receiving the same updates about protest times and
locations and the actions of the Belarusian police and special security forces, enabling relatively
synchronized protests in cities all across Belarus. 113
The organizational resilience of the pro-democracy protesters in Belarus is remarkable -the protest organizers were able to effectively side-step the regime’s emergency restrictions on
internet access and use during the first waves of major demonstrations. In other cases where the
organization of protests was more dependent on traditional forms of media rather than largescale messaging boards and announcement channels, the regime’s strategy of blocking or
outright shutting down the outlets might have worked. It also enabled the opposition leaders,
many of whom had been forced to flee Belarus for their own safety, to continue communicating
with their supporters in the streets of Belarus.
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Security Apparatus
The Belarusian security apparatus is a group of opaque, feared organizations. The main
Belarusian intelligence agency still bears the name of its feared Soviet predecessor, the KGB.
Together with the Interior and Defense Ministries, the security apparatus in Belarus has shown
itself to be eager to protect the regime from all threats foreign or domestic, even if it means
brutalizing the people of Belarus. The culture of the various security organizations appears to be
similar to that in Russia -- the state generally comes before the people.
While the Belarusian economy has had its fair share of troubles in the three decades since
independence, Lukashenko’s regime has always found the money to put into the security
services. Belarus does not have the same natural resources as Russia or Azerbaijan, where oil
revenues could be used to fund security operations. However, pipelines carrying Russian oil
westward across Belarus to the rest of Europe still provide billions of dollars in oil export
revenue to the regime, helping prop it up and enabling the funding of its operations. 114 The
regime in Belarus did not have the same problems paying its enforcers that the Shevardnadze
regime had in Georgia in 2003. So long as the enforcers got paid for doing their jobs, there was
no real risk of the security forces losing their motivation to defend the regime or defecting to the
democratization movement, at least from an economic point of view.
In contrast to the Georgian and Kyrgyz situations, the security apparatus in Belarus was
and is very loyal to Lukashenko. Lukashenko has to depend on the unity, loyalty, and willingness
to “crack heads” of his security forces to maintain his grip on power. 115 To ensure the necessary
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loyalty, Lukashenko has changed around some of his heads of the security organizations in 2020.
Lukashenko appointed Ivan Tertel to be the next head of the KGB in response to the Russian
offer of support for Lukashenko. Tertel is loyal, and he and Lukashenko have worked together in
suppressing political unrest before.116 Yuri Karayev, head of the Interior Ministry which sent out
the OMON special police units to repress the pro-democracy protests, is firmly loyal to
Lukashenko as well.117 Viktor Khrenin, a loyal and unimaginative supporter of the regime, was
named Minister of the Defense, and during the protests he declared to his military subordinates
that there was a real possibility that the military would have to get involved to suppress the
protests.118 The loyalty of the heads of the Belarusian security apparatus cannot be doubted, and
this loyalty likely extends much farther down into the ranks, giving Lukashenko a powerful
security apparatus that he was able to use to clamp down on the democratization movement and
maintain power.
Exogenous Theories
International Linkages and Diffusion
The exogenous theories of democratization normally play an important role in the
formation and spread of democratization movements. In Belarus, however, the effects of
international linkages and diffusion were blunted by Belarus’s geopolitical position and
dependence on Russia. Political liberalization and reform had been virtually halted by
Lukashenko during his decades in power, stunting the growth of nongovernmental organizations
both domestic and foreign. Further, restrictions were actually placed on the operations of NGOs,
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limiting the impact that any existing NGOs could have. The regime took careful steps to prevent
another Georgia or Kyrgyzstan scenario from playing out in Belarus.
In contrast to the situation of international linkages and diffusion in Russia, Belarus is
more vulnerable to external Western pressure. Belarus is not a particularly large or powerful
country on the global stage, and it has thus had to manage its relations with both Russia and its
neighbors in the European Union. Belarus does have significant ties to the West, due to it
bordering a number of European Union member states and also via gas pipelines that cross
through its territory, carrying Russian gas exports to the EU. 119 However, Belarus’s close ties to
Russia have served to insulate Lukashenko’s government from any serious Western
democratizing pressure through political backing and major economic subsidies from Russia. 120
In addition to the economic and political backing from Russia insulating the Lukashenko
regime from external democratizing pressure, the development aid from Western democracies
that was so influential in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan was restricted in Belarus. NGOs that might
have received guidance and funding from abroad had that financial backing cut off in 2003 when
Lukashenko implemented a law that forced NGOs to receive prior approval before receiving
donations from abroad and greatly restricted the operations for which donation funds were
allowed to be used.121 This attempt at defunding the NGOs that might have helped Belarusian
civil society develop was relatively successful. Western influence on Belarusian civil society has
been nowhere near as effective at promoting democratization as it was in Georgia and
Kyrgyzstan, where such restrictive laws were never implemented.
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Conclusion
The failure of the 2020 democratization movement in Belarus in 2020 can be understood
through the lens of theories of democratization. In Belarus’s case, the effects of these theories
appear to be limited, or even completely negated, by actions taken by Lukashenko’s regime. The
endogenous theories about economic and political reforms, agency of activists in the streets, and
the strength and effectiveness of the security apparatus can be used to understand the situation in
Belarus, especially when examining the steps taken by the regime to limit democratizing
pressure from within. No major business/oligarch class that could challenge the regime ever
really developed in Belarus since the state maintained control over most of the economy. In
addition, the security apparatus is loyal to Lukashenko and more than willing to use force to
break up protests. The exogenous theories again have largely been negated by Lukashenko’s
choice to stay close to an increasingly-authoritarian Russia, and the limitations on NGOs have
prevented foreign, pro-democracy NGOs from gaining very much ground in Belarus. The antidemocratic conditions created by the Lukashenko regime in Belarus severely limited or outright
negated virtually all of the theories of democratization.
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Conclusion
The democratization movements in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Belarus each began
with similar circumstances: increasingly authoritarian leaders, growing corruption in the
government, and fraudulent elections. In Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the democratization
movements were successful in achieving change: the Georgian and Kyrgyz regimes were toppled
and replaced with at least nominally more pro-democracy leaders and governments. In Russia
and Belarus, the opposite was true. The regimes in those countries were not removed from
power, and in some ways they may have even tightened their grip on power. The Russian and
Belarusian democratization movements, then, were not successful in achieving meaningful
democratic change.
Each of these four democratization movements, even with their differing outcomes, can
be understood through the theories of the democratization that have been developed over the last
several decades. Georgia is perhaps the model example of the theories in practice; both the
endogenous and exogenous theories appear to have played out there in the 2003 mass protest
movement that brought Georgia closer to democracy. The events in Georgia have likewise
influenced the further development of the theories of democratization in the nearly two decades
since its political reckoning. The theories can be well applied in Kyrgyzstan’s case, too, though
perhaps not as clearly as in Georgia, thanks to Kyrgyzstan’s vastly different political landscape
and history of mass pro-democracy protests. Both countries moved quickly towards establishing
market economies and fostered vibrant civil societies, enabling the financing and spread of prodemocracy ideas in both countries. Both also had extensive ties to other democracies. The
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Georgian protesters were well-organized and determined, and the Georgian security apparatus
was not strong or loyal enough to effectively end the protests. The Kyrgyz protesters may not
have received the same training as their Georgian counterparts, but they were just as determined,
and the Kyrgyz security apparatus was similarly ineffective at controlling and ending the protests
before the government was toppled.
In contrast, the Russian and Belarusian democratization movements may be understood
through the steps taken by their regimes to negate any influences that might shift their countries
toward democracy. Stalled reforms, restrictions on outside pro-democracy influence, and
repressive political cultures coupled with fearsome security organizations all played a part in the
failure of the protests in both Russia and Belarus. Russia’s commanding presence on the world
stage insulated it from Western democratizing influences, and Belarus’s close relationship with
Russia did the same in the end. Economic reliance on oil and gas revenues slowed, and
potentially reversed, some of the economic reforms that might have aided the spread of
democracy in Russia. Belarus has always been averse to reforms under Lukashenko’s regime,
and its dependence on the Russian economy has fused its political-economic structure ever
tighter with Russia’s.
Table 5, shown on the following page, compares the Polity2 (democracy) scores to the
Index of Economic Freedom rating for each of the four countries. In terms of political and
economic reform, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan are the clear leaders, with higher ratings for both
measurements across all years thanks to their wide-reaching reforms. Russia and Belarus, on the
other hand, did not reform their political and economic systems as much, or had the effects of
their reforms curtailed by state interests. Their lower scores across the board are a reflection of
this reality created by the reactions of authoritarian states to the “encroachment” of pro-
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democracy pressures both at home and abroad, seen in the stagnated reforms, consolidation of
political and economic power, and the brutal repression tactics employed by these states.
Table 5: Comparison of Polity2 Scores and Economic Freedom Index

Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Belarus
EF
EF
EF
EF
Polity2 Index Polity2 Index Polity2 Index Polity2 Index
4
47.9
-3
51.8
3
52.8
-7
38
4
52.5
-3
54.8
3
54.5
-7
35.4
2
54.3
-3
55.7
6
51.8
-7
41.3
2
58.3
-3
53.7
6
49.8
-7
38
2
56.7
-3
51.7
6
48.7
-7
39
2
58.6
-3
56.8
6
50.8
-7
39.7
6
58.9
-3
58
6
52.8
-7
43.1
7
57.1
3
56.6
6
51.3
-7
46.7
7
64.5
4
61
6
52.4
-7
47.5
6
69.3
3
60.2
4
52.2
-7
47
6
69.2
3
61.1
4
49.8
-7
45.3
6
69.8
1
61.8
4
50.8
-7
45
6
70.4
4
61.3
4
50.3
-7
48.7
6
70.4
7
61.1
4
50.5
-7
47.9
6
69.4
7
60.2
4
50.5
-7
49
7
72.2
7
59.6
4
51.1
-7
48
7
72.6
7
61.1
4
51.9
-7
50.1
7
73
7
61.3
4
52.1
-7
49.8
7
72.6
7
59.6
4
50.6
-7
48.8
7
76
8
61.1
4
57.1
-7
58.6
7
76.2
8
62.8
4
58.2
-7
58.1

Sources: Polity5 Annual Time-Series, 1946-2018 and Heritage Foundation 2021 Index of Economic Freedom

Ultimately, the theories of democratization apply in each of these four case studies. In
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, their predictions are largely proven to be correct and applicable in each
country. In Russia and Belarus, their general predictions are not what occurred. However, they
are still valuable in that they illuminate what authoritarian regimes might do to suppress
democratization in their countries. Perhaps there are other ways activists might engage with
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authoritarian regimes to bring about democratization that are not so well described by existing
theories, and it is still possible to create change in those countries.
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